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How Investors Interpret Past Fund Returns
ABSTRACT
The literature documents a convex relation between past returns and fund flows of
mutual funds.  We show this to be consistent with fund incentives, because funds
discard exactly those strategies which underperform.  Past returns tell less about the
future performance of funds which discard, so flows are less sensitive to them when
they are poor.  Our model predicts that strategy changes only occur after bad
performance, and that bad performers who change strategy have dollar flow and
future performance that are less sensitive to current performance than those that do
not.  Empirical tests support both predictions.
1How Investors Interpret Past Fund Returns
Investors who condition open-end mutual fund allocations on past performance appear to be
relatively indifferent among bad returns. Several recent papers (e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998),
Ippolito (1992)) show net new investment to be much less sensitive to past returns in the region
of bad returns, as if all returns below some threshold send roughly the same signal to investors
about future prospects.  Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
interpret this pattern as the fund’s implicit compensation scheme and ask whether this induces
the asset substitution associated with convex compensation;  our goal here is to determine why
the pattern occurs in the first place and provide empirical support for our explanation.
A mutual fund’s shareholders delegate its productive decisions to an investment advisor. 
The shareholders and other investors can not usually observe these decisions directly, but they
can infer them from the fund’s operating performance, and invest accordingly.  The finance
literature usually models this inference/investment process as: 1) estimating a fund’s past risk-
adjusted expected return, and 2) investing on the assumption that the past risk-adjusted expected
return will persist into the future (e.g. Ippolito (1992)).  This paradigm has some intuitive appeal
and empirical support, but it does not take into account the investment advisor’s option to
disconnect past and future performance.  We propose an explanation for the empirical results on
fund flows by way of a model that incorporates this option.
The use of performance measures as estimates of future performance assumes (among
other things) that the relevant personnel and management techniques carry forward from the
past.  Our point, building on the argument of Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), is that funds
respond to bad - but not good - performance by replacing the personnel or techniques that
2produced it.  What we can observe of investment advisors’ operating decisions, such as manager
replacements (Khorana (1996)) and mergers (Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996)) bears out this
intuition.  This abandonment option transforms the relationship between new investment and
past returns, because if a bad return and a very bad return both mean that the next return will
reflect a new strategy, the magnitude of their difference has little predictive power, and therefore
little effect on investment decisions.  With the exception of the very worst funds, this dynamic
also fits the actual shape of performance persistence - flatter in the region of bad past returns.
Our model has several implications.  First, strategy changes only occur after bad fund
performance.  Second, bad performers who change strategy have dollar flow and future
performance that are less sensitive to current performance than those who do not.  We test these
implications using daily mutual fund returns from Micropal and manager-change dates from the
CRSP mutual fund data set.  We use three proxies for strategy change.  The first two are based
on a fund’s average absolute change in risk loading, where one proxy is the loading change
itself, while the other takes those funds in the top quartile of loading changes for each fund type
in each year to be those that changed strategy.  Risk loadings are obtained from the four-factor
model of Carhart (1997) and Busse (1999).  Manager change is used as the third proxy. 
To test the first implication, we define bad performance to be either negative or bottom-
quartile performance and we use two measures of performance, four-factor alpha and group-
adjusted four-factor alpha.  For all combinations of performance measure and bad-performance
definition but one, we find a significantly greater incidence of both manager changes and
top-quartile loading changes among bad performers than good performers, as well as a
significantly higher average loading change. The only exception defines bad performance to be
3negative absolute alpha.  These results are consistent with the first implication of the model.
We then test the second implication by running piece-wise linear regressions of future
performance or dollar flow on current performance, with a single breakpoint at zero.  Thus, the
sensitivity of the dependent variable to performance is allowed to differ between bad performers
and good performers.  Each of these sensitivities is also allowed to differ based on the value of
the strategy-change proxy.  The model predicts that the sensitivity of dollar flow to current
performance for bad performers is lower for those bad performers who change strategy.
Consistent with the model, we always obtain this result, irrespective of which of the three
strategy change proxies is used or whether performance is measured using absolute or relative
four-factor alpha.  Moreover, the difference is significant in five of the six cases.  The model also
predicts that the sensitivity of future performance to current performance for bad performers is
lower for those bad performers who change strategy.  But when future performance is used as the
dependent variable in the regression, we are only able to confirm this prediction when we use
manager change as the strategy change proxy.  Considered together, these empirical results
provide strong support for the model.  
 The rest of this paper is in six sections.  In Section I we discuss the literature on
performance persistence and fund flows, and outline our reasoning.  Section II describes and
solves a simple model which captures this reasoning, and in Section III we discuss the main
implications of the model and their correspondence to the existing empirical literature.  Section
IV extends the model to allow for multiple funds.  Our empirical testing of the model is
described in Section V while Section VI  summarizes and concludes.
4I.  Background
The information content of fund returns is one of the oldest and most popular topics in
finance.  A large portion of the academic literature has considered how to measure it, and much
of the popular press has tried to report it.  It is not surprising in this context that the relation
between new investment and past returns is positive.  What is surprising is that the relation is
qualitatively different for lower and higher past returns.  Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998)
and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) all find a small positive slope in the lower region and a
considerably larger slope in the higher region.  Goetzmann and Peles (1996) find a significant
relation between flows and past returns only for the top quartile of past returns.
The asymmetric flow-response pattern is consistent with investors expecting a relation
between past and future performance with a convex shape.  That is, investors put slightly less
cash into bad funds than mediocre ones because bad funds’prospects are slightly worse than
those of mediocre funds, whereas they put considerably more cash into good funds than
mediocre ones because good funds’ prospects are considerably better than those of mediocre
funds.  This fits the published results on performance persistence, with the notable exception of
the very worst funds.  Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (HPZ) (1993) estimated the past
return/future performance relationship with a sample of fund returns covering 1974 to 1988 by
sorting funds at each quarter-end into octile portfolios by their total returns over the past year,1
then measuring the portfolios’ performance over the following quarter.  Brown and Goetzmann
(BG) (1995) ran the same test on a sample covering 1976 to 1988, except they rebalanced every
year-end and held for a year.  Carhart (1997) ran this test over the period 1963 to 1993, using
decile portfolios and calculating monthly returns.  Figure 1 reports the returns net of the risk-free
5rate reported for these portfolios, and Figure 2 reports the returns net of market-risk exposure
(i.e. Jensen’s alphas).  The HPZ quarterly numbers are multiplied by four and the Carhart
numbers are multiplied by 12 to approximate the scale of the annual BG numbers.  Setting aside
the worst group, these point estimates reproduce the fund-flow pattern, where the slope of flows
on performance is flatter on the left than on the right.  This result is not sensitive to the choice of
risk-adjustment; Gruber (1996) forms and evaluates portfolios of funds using intercepts from
regressions on four factors2 and finds the same pattern, as reproduced in Figure 3.  However,
notice that some risk adjustment is important since the pattern is less discernable in Figure 1
using excess returns than in the other two figures using risk-adjusted performance. 
The correspondence between the fund-flow and persistence patterns begs two questions. 
The first is how to explain the continued investment in the worst performers, a puzzle already
noted by BG, Gruber (1996) and others.  We do not attempt to resolve these investors’ behavior
with rational decision-making, which, evidence suggests, may be futile in any case.  For
example, Goetzmann and Peles (1996) document biases in investor information sets which could
encourage bottom-fund investors to stay put, and Sawaya (1992), Brandstrader (1992) and
Rukeyser (1996) argue that many bottom-fund investors may be dead.  Gruber (1996) posits the
existence of a “disadvantaged clientele,” which includes investors who are either locked into bad
funds by institutional restrictions (e.g. pension plan menus) or accrued capital gains, or who
follow the advice of advertisements or brokers, and Christoffersen and Musto (2002) provide
evidence that bottom-fund investors are relatively less sensitive to performance and price. The
population of bottom-fund investors appears, in any case, to be small; Goetzmann and Peles
(1996) estimate the fraction of mutual fund investors in bottom-octile funds at two to three
6percent (as opposed to around 28 percent in octile 8).
The other question raised by the empirical results is the source of the asymmetry.  Our
response is that the investment advisor, like most other enterprises, holds an option to replace its
production method.  Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) (HS)  argue that “a manager is retained if his
performance is ‘good enough’ relative to an alternative for the client.”  In the equilibrium of
their two-period model with a risk-neutral investor and a risk-neutral manager with unknown
skill, the manager must outperform a threshold return in the first period to keep his job for the
second.  This analysis delivers several predictions about the design and purpose of management
contracts, but not about fund flows, since the risk-neutral investor simply invests all his money
with whatever manager he hires.  We modify and extend the HS analysis to study the fund flows,
and find that it predicts the observed convex relationship.
HS model the situation where an investor delegates the choice between asset-selection
algorithms to a portfolio manager. The fund-flow results refer to open-end mutual funds, which
insert an additional layer of delegation: investors delegate the choice of a portfolio manager to an
investment advisor (e.g. Fidelity Management Corporation), and the portfolio manager (e.g.
Peter Lynch) chooses the asset-selection algorithm.  By the same logic as in HS, retail investors
can expect that the investment advisor will retain exactly those managers whose performance is
“good enough” compared to other potential managers.3  As a consequence, a fund’s realized
returns convey two facts to investors: the expected future performance of the same manager, and
whether or not the manager will actually persist. If a fund’s past return is below the retention
threshold, investors know the next return will reflect a new manager so it hardly matters just how
bad the past return was.  If the return signals that last period’s manager will be next period’s
7manager, then it does matter. Expected future returns, and therefore the net new investments of
risk-averse consumers, are consequently more sensitive to past returns above the threshold.
Our reasoning applies to more than just the investment advisor’s choice between
retaining and replacing his manager.  The manager himself can retain or replace his asset-
selection algorithm, and this decision also hinges on the past return.  A manager deploys an
algorithm (momentum, book-to-market, etc.) with some prior belief about its value, but has some
residual uncertainty that its realized returns can help resolve. As in HS, there will be a threshold
past return that determines whether or not the manager’s past algorithm persists in the future, and
investors can invest on the knowledge that the manager must have abandoned his old algorithm
without actually observing him do it. 
The argument is based on the idea that underperforming managers and algorithms are
abandoned.  For managers, this is obvious: a portfolio manager is either retained or replaced. 
But in the portfolio-selection context there is the possibility of short-selling.  A manager may,
depending on transactions costs, be able to transform a money-losing strategy into a money-
making strategy by selling it short in the next period.  If mutual funds could short-sell, they
might be expected to reverse, rather than abandon, underperforming strategies.  But for practical
purposes this is not an issue, because mutual funds can not (see the Investment Company Act of
1940, section 18) engage in meaningful short-selling.
We do not directly observe many of the internal decisions of mutual funds, such as
whether or when the stock-picking algorithm changes, but empirical evidence does indicate that
investment advisors replace managers with low recent returns.  Khorana (1996) finds a
significantly negative relationship between managerial turnover and past performance.  The
8point estimates for replacement in the year after bottom-half performance are two times the top-
half estimates (10.5 percent vs. 5.3 percent).4  A bad return reflects poorly on a fund but it also
increases the probability that the old manager will not persist into the future, whereas a good
return reflects well on the fund and increases the probability that the manager will persist.
The next section embeds this intuition in a model of money management.  Investors hire
an investment advisor, who in turn chooses a strategy that can be retained or abandoned after a
period of experience.  The strategy can be thought of as either the fund’s manager or the
manager’s stock-picking algorithm; it is an element of the fund’s productive activity that persists
only if persistence is desirable.  We endogenize the decision whether to let it persist, and show
how it delivers the convex fund-flow pattern.
II.  The Model
A. Description of the model
There are two periods.  The first begins at time-0 and ends at time-1, and the second
begins at time-1 and ends at time-2.  An investment advisor (IA) operates a mutual fund in both
periods, and consumes his wealth at time-2.  Investor 0 invests at time-0 and consumes at time-1,
and Investor 1 invests at time-1 and consumes at time-2.  The investors can allocate any positive
amount to the fund, and can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate rF, set at zero.  The IA charges
investors a fraction δ of end-of-period assets under management for managing their money, and
can invest in the riskless asset and any positive position he wants in the fund’s return.  That is, he
has the same investment opportunity set as the investors except that he doesn’t pay management
fees. The IA and both investors get utility !e-αW (α>0) from consuming wealth W.
9r1 ' µ0 % ga % gs,1 % gp,1 (1)
r2 ' µ0 % ga % gs,1 % gp,2 (2)
r2 ' µ0 % ga % gs,2 % gp,2 (3)
We model the return on a fund as a sum of individually unobservable and independently
distributed random variables.  The IA is endowed permanently with an ability level A which is a
draw from N(µ0,σ2a).  Even the IA can not observe A.  The value of A reflects his ability in that it
indexes the distribution his strategies come from.  A strategy the IA develops pays returns which
are independent draws from N(S,σ2p), where S is an unobservable draw from N(A,σ2s).  We give
the IA one decision to make after the first period, which is whether to keep his old strategy,
which means S stays the same, or abandon the old strategy in favor of a new one, which means
drawing a new S from N(A,σ2s).  Equivalently, we can write the fund’s first-period return r1 as a
constant µ0 plus three individually unobservable random variables:
where ga , gs,1 and gp,1 are independently distributed N(0,σ2a), N(0,σ2s) and N(0,σ2p).  After the first
period, the manager can keep his strategy for the second period (i.e. S stays the same), in which
case
where gp,2 is a new draw from N(0,σ2p), independent of gp,1, or he can change strategies, (i.e. draw
a new S from N(A,σ2s)),  in which case
where gs,2 is a new draw from N(0,σ2s), independent of gs,1.  So the stochastic part of r1 contains
one element ga which always persists to the next period, another element gp,1 which never
persists, and a third element gs,1 which persists if and only if the IA wants it to persist.
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B. Some comments on modeling choices
The two-investor setup greatly simplifies the computations without materially affecting
the results.  A model with one investor for both periods would behave about the same, since the
IA’s incentives to keep or abandon would stay the same, but the mathematics of the investor’s
initial allocation would be complicated enormously by the (nonlinear) relationship between the
first-period return and the second-period investment opportunity set.  
We also simplify the IA’s choice between strategies at time-1 by letting him choose his
allocation between the fund’s return and the riskless asset.  If his exposure to the fund were
constrained to equal the management fee (as it is elsewhere in the literature), his choice would
interact with his wealth level, which in turn interacts with the first-period return.  This would
complicate our discussion of the relationship between current and past returns without affecting
the basic result that bad strategies are replaced.
Instead, this assumption causes the manager to make the same strategy choices as he
would if he were investing just his own money in the fund.  Because the manager can buy or sell
the fund on personal account, a fee of δ at the end of the period is equivalent to a fee of  δ at the
start.  Thus, once the investor has decided how much to invest with the fund, the dollar value
today of the manager’s fee is known (for any δ) and his current wealth is determined.   Since the
manager has exponential utility, he wants the strategy that maximizes (µ-rF)/σ.   Consequently,
the management fee is not crucial to the model; all our arguments go through with any δ,
including δ=0.  
We constrain the IA to a mutually exclusive choice between the old strategy and a new
one.  In particular, we do not, for the reasons discussed above, allow a negative weight on the
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first-period strategy in the second period.  We  also rule out convex combinations of the old
strategy and a new strategy, but this restriction is not important to the results.  If the manager
could use a convex combination he would still put zero weight in the second period on strategies
which did badly enough in the first, causing fund flow to be less sensitive to performance below
that point.
We have a fund-specific ability term (ga) in addition to a strategy-specific term (gs) to
capture the idea that a component of fund performance cannot be altered simply by changing
strategy.  This may reflect a fund’s inability to completely turn over its management team, to
completely turn over its set of strategies or to completely change its algorithm for hiring
managers.  Stickiness on any one of these dimensions leads to a fund-specific ability term.  The
presence of a fund-specific ability term whose value is unknown means that the time-1 fund
return can convey some information about the time-2 fund return, even when the fund decides to
change strategy.  Consequently, its inclusion makes the sensitivity of fund flow to the time-1
fund return more positive.  However, the asymmetry of fund flow to time-1 fund return occurs
irrespective of the presence of the fund-specific ability term.  Instead, the kink in the relation
between fund flow and time-1 fund return is caused by the strategy-specific term and the fund’s
capacity to change strategy.  Thus, with respect to fund flow as a function of time-1 fund return,
the precision of the fund-specific ability term determines the average slope, while the precision
of the strategy-specific term determines the severity of the kink.  These results are derived and
discussed in Section III below. 
C. Derivation of fund flows
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I0 '
(1&δ)µ0&δ
α(1&δ)2(σ2a%σ2s%σ2p)
(4)
The flow of funds studied by Ippolito (1992) and others corresponds in this model to the
difference between Investor 1's initial allocation to the fund at the beginning of the second period
and Investor 0's terminal position at the end of the first, and the flow-response relationship
corresponds to the dependence of this difference on r1.  To explore this dependence we need to
characterize three decisions: 1) Investor 0's initial allocation at time-0, 2) the IA’s choice
between keeping and abandoning the first-period strategy, and 3) Investor 1's allocation at time-
1, which takes into account the IA’s incentives to keep or abandon.
D. Investor 0's allocation
Before fees, the fund’s first-period return r1 is distributed N(µ0,σa2+σs2+σp2) .  However,
the investor pays a management fee δ, making his net return (1-δ)(1+r1)-1, so from his
perspective the fund’s return is distributed N((1-δ)µ0-δ,(1-δ)2(σa2+σs2+σp2)).   A well-known
implication of the utility function !e-αW is that it drives an investor allocating between a riskless
asset paying rF and a risky asset with returns distributed N(µ,σ2) to allocate (µ-rF)/(ασ2) to the
risky asset. Thus, it is straightforward that Investor 0's allocation I0 is
and the terminal value of this allocation at time-1 is (1-δ)(1+r1)I0.
E. IA’s decision to keep or abandon
As discussed above, the IA prefers the strategy which maximizes (µ-rF)/σ, known as the
Sharpe ratio, so his decision reduces to calculating the Sharpe ratios from switching and from
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rS - N µ0%(
σ2a
σ2a%σ2s%σ2p
)(r1&µ0),(
σ2s%σ2p
σ2a%σ2s%σ2p
)σ2a%σ2s%σ2p (5)
rK - N µ0%(
σ2a%σ2s
σ2a%σ2s%σ2p
)(r1&µ0),(
σ2p
σ2a%σ2s%σ2p
)(σ2a%σ2s)%σ2p (6)
holding, and choosing the strategy associated with the larger Sharpe ratio.    The IA’s choice is
therefore between the return rS from replacing the old strategy, which follows
and the return rK from keeping the old strategy, which follows
These conditional distributions differ in two important ways.  First, variance is higher for
rS than for rK, reflecting the uncertainty added by replacing a strategy we know something about
with one we know nothing about.  In either distribution, variance does not depend on r1. 
Secondly, the expected return is linear and increasing in r1 in both distributions, but the slope is
steeper for rK.  So there is a number R* such that rK has a higher Sharpe ratio than rS if and only if
r1>R* . The IA and Investor 1 both know that the IA keeps his first-period strategy for the second
period if and only if r1>R* .  Appendix A contains an expression for R*.
F. Investor 1's allocation
Investor 1 simply backs out the µ and σ2 of the net second-period return from r1 and,  like
Investor 0, allocates (µ-rF)/(ασ2) to the fund.   We label this allocation I1(r1) and Appendix A
presents an expression for I1(r1).  As expected, investment always increases with the past return,
but at a faster rate if the past return exceeds the R* threshold.  The next section puts these results
together to address the issue of fund flows.
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F(r1) ' I1(r1) & I0 (1&δ) (1%r1). (7)
III.  Discussion
A. Fund flows as a function of time-1 fund return
The object of interest in this section is the net fund flows at time-1 as a function of r1,
F(r1), which satisfies:
In words, F(r1) equals Investor 1's initial investment minus the terminal value of Investor 0's
investment, net of fees.  We are interested in comparing the slope of the function when r1>R* to
the slope when  r1<R* and are able to obtain the following result:5  
Proposition 1:  For any time-1 fund returns a < R* and b > R* , the difference in the
slopes of the function F(.) at the two returns b and a is positive if σ2s >0, and 0
otherwise.  Moreover, the magnitude of the kink [F’(b) - F’(a)] is increasing in σ2s.
So long as the strategy-specific component has a positive variance (σ2s>0), fund flow as a
function of time-1 return has a kink at R*.  Thus, it is the existence of an uncertain strategy-
specific portion of the return togther with the manager’s capacity to change strategies that makes
fund flows convex in past returns.  When time-1 fund return is low,  the manager is inclined to
switch strategies, which decreases the predictive power of past fund return for future fund return. 
In contrast, a high time-1 fund return prompts the manager to retain the same strategy which
gives the past fund return predictive power for future fund returns.  Moreover, when the
uncertainty about the strategy-specific component is higher, time-1 return conditional on no
switching (i.e., being above R*) has greater predictive ability for future fund return, which is
why the kink is larger.
We are also interested in the effect of uncertainty about fund-specific ability on  the flow-
past return relation which can be summarized by the following proposition:  
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Proposition 2:  Setting the uncertainty associated with fund-specific ability to zero
(σ2a = 0) does not eliminate the kink in the flow-past return relation.  Instead, the
slope of the function F’(.) is increasing in σ2a, both above and below the kink.
 Thus, the presence of an uncertain fund-specific return component is not driving the kink in the
flow-past return relation.  Rather, uncertainty about fund-specific ability increases the slope of
fund flow, both above and below the kink. The intuition for this result is that greater uncertainty
about fund-specific ability makes past fund return more informative about future fund return,
irrespective of whether the manager switches strategy or not.  
This result offers an explanation for Chevalier and Ellison’s (1997) finding that the fund
flows of relatively older funds are less responsive to recent returns.  We have just shown that the
response of new investment to recent returns is lower everywhere when uncertainty about fund-
specific ability, as indexed by σ2a, is relatively low.  This uncertainty declines over time for a
given fund as more returns are realized, which implies that this uncertainty is lower for older
than younger funds.  Thus, the result implies that fund flow should be less responsive to recent
fund returns for older than newer funds, just as Chevalier and Ellison report.
Finally, increased uncertainty about the period-specific component of fund return can be
expected to reduce the slope of flow as a function of past return.  Indeed, some algebra (not
reproduced) confirms that FN(r1) decreases as σ2p increases for any r1.  The intuition is as follows: 
the information in r1 about r2 is smaller when the period-specific portion of the return is larger,
so Investor 1 is less responsive to the time-1 return. 
B. A numerical example
16
R it ' βit R Mt % r it (8)
A sample vector of parameters illustrates how the model can generate an asymmetric
flow-past return relation like we see in the data.  Suppose the IA and investors get utility
-e-(0.0001)W from consuming W, the management fee δ is one percent, the unconditional mean µ0 of
managed portfolios is eight percent, and (σ2a,σ2s,σ2p) = (0.005,0.02,0.025).  This economy follows
the fund-flow relationship of Figure 4, which shows much higher sensitivity to past returns
above R*=5.49 percent than below.  When investors account for the IA’s motive and opportunity
to keep or abandon his old strategy, the result is a flow-response relationship like the one we
actually observe. The vertical jog at R* is not visible in the flow data averaged across funds, but
this would be a natural consequence of R* varying across funds.
The role of the strategy-specific component is apparent in Figure 5, which shows the
effect on the fund-flow relationship from moving σ2s up from 0.02 to 0.03 and then 0.04. 
Convexity increases as the slope on the below-R* side flattens and the slope on the above-R* side
steepens.
IV.  Extending the Model to Allow for Multiple Funds
The model developed above can be generalized to an economy with arbitrarily many
funds.  Suppose Investor 0 and Investor 1 have access to N actively-managed funds, the risk-free
rate and a market-index futures contract.   Let the return on fund i in period t be given by:
where rit is defined as in (1) for t=1 and as in (2) or (3) for t=2, βit is a known constant, and  RMt
is the market-index return. Thus, rit is the fund-specific component of fund i’s return in period t.  
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All  return components are multivariate normal with ρ[RMt,rit]=0 for all i and ρ[rit,rjt]=0 for all
i…j.  Investors can allocate any positive amount to any fund, borrow or lend at the risk-free rate,
and buy or sell the index futures.  Each IA can go short or long in the risk-free rate, his fund’s
return and the futures.  All IAs and both investors get utility !e-αW (α>0) from consuming wealth
W .  
Fund i’s IA charges the investor a fraction δi of the end-of-period assets under
management less the dollar return from the market-wide component over the period.  This is a
variety of the benchmark-adjusted fees that have become popular (see, e.g., Admati and
Pfleiderer (1997)): a fraction δi of the start-of-period assets under management plus the same
fraction δi of any dollar performance in excess of a benchmark, where the benchmark is the
market-wide return component.  Letting Iit be the investor’s allocation to fund i at the end of
period t, we see that fund i’s fee for period t is  Iit-1 δi (1 + rit ).
The futures contract allows the investors to target their market exposures separately from
their fund allocations, so their effective opportunity set is the risk-free rate plus N+1 independent
returns: N fund-specific returns, and that of the market.  Similarly, the IA of fund i, because his
fee income is linear in his fund-specific return, can choose any linear combination of the risk-
free rate and two independent returns, rit and RMt.   Since the IA’s fee is net of the market-wide
dollar return component, it follows that the values taken by the βit do not affect the IA’s strategy-
adoption decision nor the investor’s allocations to the N funds.  
Thus, without loss of generality, we set βit equal to zero for all i and all t.  Note, with this
simplification, it is easy to see that a fund’s IA continues to make the same strategy adoption
decision as in Section II.  Turning to the investor’s allocation decision, recall that an
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exponential-utility investor with access to a riskless asset paying rF and N+1 uncorrelated assets
each distributed N[µi,(σi)2] allocates (µi-rF)/(α(σi)2) to each risky asset i, where α is the investor’s
risk aversion.  Consequently, Investor 0 and Investor 1 make the same dollar allocation to each
fund i as they made to the single fund in Section II.  Thus, Section II’s analysis of the relation
between the single fund’s first-period performance and its fund flow at the end of the first period
holds for each fund in the extended model.  
Note that a badly-performing fund in the first period cannot invest in the second period in
a fund that performed well.  The badly-performing fund’s only choices are to keep the first
period strategy or switch.  This assumption is consistent with restrictions on managers in the
U.S. mutual fund industry.  On the other hand, the investors are allowed to invest any positive
amount in each of the N funds.  Consistent with intuition, Investor 1 (who invests in period 2)
allocates more to a fund that performed well in the first period than to a fund that performed
poorly.  However, Investor 1 chooses to invest positive amounts in badly performing funds
because there are diversification benefits from holding these funds.6   In particular, because
badly performing managers switch strategies, the positive relation between fund flow and
performance is flatter for bad performance than good performance (see Section II and III for
details).  Thus, the model developed in Section II is robust to the existence of multiple funds. 
One final point is worth making.  In the current model, the fund managers are precluded
from indexing.  However, a straight-forward extension could make this an option available to the
manager.  In such a model, a manager would index in the second period if his return in the first is
sufficiently bad to make the index more attractive than a draw from the manager’s distribution of
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strategies.  Importantly, the model would still imply an asymmetric flow response to
performance. 
V.  Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical tests of the theory.  As noted, the existing empirical
literature is generally consistent with the predictions, in that net new investment is convex in
past performance, as is future performance, the very worst funds excepted.  But the predictions
are more specific than this, and with the help of some proxies they become rejectable
hypotheses.
The theory predicts that funds replace poor-performing strategies, and that this reduces
the sensitivities of fund flow and expected future performance to differences between poor
performances.  That is, the sensitivities are lower among poor performers specifically because
the strategies of these funds are replaced.  So to the extent that replacement is observable and
frictions keep a group of poor performers from replacing, the theory predicts greater sensitivities
in this group than in the group of poor performers who replace.  Strategy replacement is not
directly observable so to test this prediction we calculate proxies, and then compare the
sensitivities among those poor performers that replace (according to the proxy) to the
sensitivities among those that do not.
We have three proxies for strategy replacement.  One is manager replacement.  Both
Khorana (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) argue that managerial turnover following poor
performance reflects firing or demotion, and therefore an intention of the investment advisor to
change the distribution of fund returns.  Managers also sometimes leave after good performance,
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but this is more likely to reflect promotion or other career improvement (or retirement), and not
an intention to change the distribution of fund returns.  So managerial turnover should reduce the
sensitivities of fund flow and future performance to past performance among poor performers. 
Managerial turnover could reduce sensitivities among good performers, depending on how
instrumental the departing managers were to the strategies.
The other two proxies are based on loading change.  By one of these proxies, a fund
replaces strategy if the change in its regression coefficients on the four factors of Carhart (1997)
is relatively large.  By the other proxy, the likelihood of a strategy change is increasing in the
magnitude of the loading change.  The rationale for these proxies is that a fund’s expected
loading change is larger if it changes strategy than if it does not.7  The finding of Chan, Chen and
Lakonishok (2002) that funds change style (e.g. large-cap, high book-to-market) after poor
performance is consistent with this view.  The benefit of these proxies, relative to manager
replacement, is that they can detect strategy replacements of all types, not just those involving
managerial turnover.  The cost is that regression-coefficient changes are noisy estimates of
factor-loading changes, whereas managerial turnover is observed with little or no error. 
Moreover, these proxies should again reduce sensitivity to past performance primarily among
poor performers, as large loading change after good performance is more likely due to something
other than strategy replacement.
The test design assumes some incidence of poor performers not replacing which is
reasonable for three reasons.  First, the model does not dictate the evaluation schedule, i.e., the
first and last dates of the first period.  We use the standard one-calendar-year schedule but funds
could take more or less time, and could start on other days, so some funds who perform badly on
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our schedule will not immediately replace even if funds always replace immediately on their
own schedules.  Second, the performance cutoff that triggers replacement depends on parameters
that would vary across funds, so when our cross-sectional regressions impose the same cutoff on
all funds, some performances are bound to be in the wrong bin.  That is, some performances we
take to be poor are actually good relative to the cutoffs implied by their fund-specific parameters.
Finally, strategy replacement may be costly.  So, for all these reasons, there should be some
incidence of measured poor performance not followed in short order by strategy replacement,
providing the contrast necessary for our tests.
A. Data
The database combines daily returns from Micropal, annual fund data from CRSP and
factor returns.  The Micropal data run from 1985 through 1995, with 2435 funds as of the
terminal date 12/31/1995.  Disappearing funds are included until their disappearance dates,
except for some of the funds that disappeared before 1991.  Micropal divides the funds into six
categories: Aggressive Growth (AG), Growth and Income (GI), Income (IN), International (IE),
Long-Term Capital Gains (LG), and Sector (SF).  Since the four factor model of Carhart (1997)
is not designed to measure the performance of foreign equities or bonds, we use only the fund
categories that hold U.S. equities exclusively.  This criterion rules out the IE and IN funds.  The
SF funds are also omitted because their latitude to change strategies is relatively low.    This
leaves us with three categories of funds: AG, GI and LG funds.  These are the same three
categories used by Sirri and Tufano (1998) to study the relation between fund flow and past
performance.
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We use the standard four factors, all of which are daily returns on zero-investment
portfolios (see Busse (1999) for details): 1) VW CRSP index minus the risk-free rate (RMRF); 2)
small-cap minus big cap (SMB); 3) high book-to-market minus low book-to-market (HML); and,
4) recent (six-month) winners minus losers (MOM).  To calculate excess returns we use the daily
risk-free return, also from Busse (1999).8  From the CRSP mutual-fund database we take the
variable MGR_DATE, which comes from the annual snapshot of fund information assembled by
ICDI, and later Micropal, and is available annually for the four year period from 1992 through
1995.9  We also take TNAi,y and ri,y, the total net assets at the end of year y and the total return for
year y, respectively, for fund i.
For year y of fund i we calculate several statistics.  If there are at least 20 daily returns
then we regress excess returns, i.e., the daily returns minus the daily risk-free rate, on the four
factors and save the intercept and coefficients as αi,y, bRMRF,i,y, bSMB,i,y, bHML,i,y and bMOM,i,y.  Rαi,y is
αi,y minus the average αi,y of the funds of i’s type (AG, GI or LG) in year y. If we have TNAi,y,
TNAi,y-1 and ri,y then dollar flow is DFLi,y=TNAi,y!(1+ri,y)TNAi,y-1.
We use two loading change proxies.  The first is the average absolute change in fund i’s
factor loadings from year y-1 to year y+1, i.e. LDELi,y = (1/4)3|bf,i,y+1-bf,i,y-1| for f=RMRF, SMB,
HML and MOM.  The second loading-change proxy QLCHi,y is “1" if LDELi,y is in the top
quartile of the LDELi,y for funds of the same type as fund i in year y, and is “0" otherwise.10  The
manager-change proxy for fund i’s strategy change, QMCHi,y is “1" if  the most recent manager
change date recorded on CRSP for year y+1 occurred either sometime during year y (if no month
is given) or between July of year y and June of year y+1; and QMCHi,y is “0" if the most recent
manager change date lies outside these ranges.  A QMCHi,y value of “1" is changed to “0" if: a)
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year y is the commencement year for the fund as recorded on CRSP; b) the most recent manager
change date recorded on CRSP for year y+1 occurred sometime during year y; and, c) the first
fund return on CRSP is not for a month prior to the most recent manager change date. 
B. Empirical results
Each table contains the empirical results for one strategy-change proxy.  The LDEL
results are in Table I, the QLCH results are in Table II, and the QMCH results are in Table III.
The first empirical question is whether the proxies show more evidence of strategy replacement
after poor, as opposed to good, performance.  We use two definitions of poor performance,
negative and bottom-quartile performance, applied to two performance measures,  the four-factor
alpha α and the group-adjusted four-factor alpha Rα.   For each proxy, the results are in Panel A
of the relevant table.  
Overall, the results for the two proxies based on loading change are consistent with the
literature and the theory.  Chan, Chen and Lakonishok (2002) find increased style migration
following poor performance. Using LDEL to measure loading change, we find higher average
absolute loading changes for all definitions of poor performance except negative α, and we
always find a greater incidence of large loading changes for poor performers.  However, when
using LDEL to measure loading change, funds with the most extreme measured performance are
likely to be those with the largest measurement error in performance and LDEL.  Consistent with
this effect, Panel A of Table I documents a u-shaped pattern in average LDEL across the
performance quartiles.  Moreover, since only one third of funds are positive-α, this effect can
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also explain why average LDEL is significantly lower (3.7 percent one-tail) for negative-α than
positive-α funds.  
In an attempt to correct for this effect, we also use an estimate of average loading change,
LCOR, that deflates absolute regression-loading changes by estimates of their standard errors.11 
While use of LCOR reduces sorting based on measurement error, it also reduces one’s ability to
sort on the basis of true changes in loadings.  Despite this disadvantage of using LCOR, we still
find that loading change is significantly higher for the bottom performance quartile, irrespective
of performance measure, and for the negative Rα funds. 
Turning to the manager change results, Panel A of Table III documents a significantly
higher incidence of managerial turnover after worse performance, for both definitions of poor
performance and both performance measures.  Again this result is consistent with earlier
literature (see Khorana, 1996).  To summarize, these Panel A results all bear out the prediction
that the investment advisors of poor performers exercise the option to replace strategy.
Does strategy replacement have the predicted effect on fund flows?  Theory predicts that
it lowers the sensitivity to differences between poor past performances.  This is testable in a
regression model that allows different slopes for good and poor performances, interacted with
the proxies for replacement.  That is, we fit the regression model
DFLi,y+1=b0 + b1proxyi,y + b2(perfi,y)+ + b3(proxyi,y)(perfi,y)+ + b4(perfi,y)- + b5(proxyi,y)(perfi,y)- +gi,y+1
where (x)+ is x for x>0 and 0 otherwise, (x)- is x for x<0 and 0 otherwise, perf is either α or Rα,
and proxy is either LDEL, QLCH or QMCH.12  The prediction is that (proxyi,y)(perfi,y)- enters
negatively.  Panel B of Table I reports the results using LDEL as the strategy-change proxy. 
Consistent with the theory, we find that the sensitivity of flow to poor performance is
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significantly lower when LDEL is higher, for both definitions of poor performance.13  Panel B of
Tables II and III reports the results for the dummy proxies which also bear out the theory.  In
three of the four cases, the sensitivity of flow to differences between poor performances is
significantly reduced when the proxies indicate replacement.  Thus, strategy replacement, as
captured by manager and loading change, reduces the significance to new investment of how
poor a poor performance was.
The predictions for the relation between future and past performance are analogous, so
we can test them with the same regression framework.  We have two alternative performance
measures, so we fit the model
perfi,y+1=b0 + b1proxyi,y + b2(perfi,y)+ + b3(proxyi,y)(perfi,y)+ + b4(perfi,y)- + b5(proxyi,y)(perfi,y)- +gi,y+1
first with perf=α on both sides of the equation, and then with perf=Rα on both sides, and test the
prediction that (proxyi,y)(perfi,y)- enters negatively.  Results are in Panel B of Tables I (LDEL), II
(QLCH) and III (QMCH) and provide additional support for the theory.  As predicted, the
interactions come in significantly negative for (perf)- after manager change, with either
performance measure.  However, the regressions do not pick up a significant effect using either
loading change proxy.  Significance is not as consistent as in the fund-flow tests, which is not
surprising given that fund flows are observed directly and expected performance is observed
only with substantial noise.
By embedding the optionality of persistence into the money-management problem, we
predict not only much of the previously documented patterns in fund flows and performance
persistence, but also additional dynamics along the new dimension of strategy replacement. 
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Replacement should weaken the link between poor performance and subsequent performance
and investment, and these new results are evidence that it does.
VI.  Conclusion
Previous research shows that open-end funds with better performance tend to perform
better in the future, and tend to attract more new investment.  It is natural, as Gruber (1996)
argues, that the first pattern causes most or all of the second, but why is the new investment
relationship convex?  What could investors be thinking, and for what reason?  We make two
points.  First, the relationship between past and future performance of all but the worst funds also
appears to be convex.  But more importantly, we show that convexity follows directly from the
strategic environment of investment advisors.  We propose that some money management
strategies are better than others, and that the information about a strategy is the returns it pays. 
Given the widespread restrictions on short-selling, it follows that investment advisors replace
strategies with bad past performance, so that future performance and net new investment are
relatively insensitive to past returns below some threshold.
In our model, returns that are sufficiently bad will always induce replacement. This is
sufficient, but not necessary for the results about convexity.  For example, agency problems
within the fund family could impose a probability that managers or algorithms are not replaced
when they should be. As long as investors view persistence as very likely after returns that are
good enough and very unlikely after returns that aren’t, the rational fund-flow response is
convex. This is also consistent with the evidence in Chevalier and Ellison (1999) that bad
performers that change managers suffer less outflow than those that retain; outsiders know when
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the investment advisor should replace the manager, but they don’t count on it until it actually
happens.
This paper relates to a growing literature on the connection between fund flows and
future performance.  Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) confirm what the fund-flow and
persistence literatures suggest, that investors bias their allocations toward tomorrow’s winners. 
We make the additional point that fund flows capture useful information that a linear
extrapolation of past returns would miss.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Expressions and Proofs
Expression for R*:  
Some algebra shows that
Expression for I1(r1):  
The allocation I1(r1) is given by
for r1<R*; that given for r1>R* is
Proof of Proposition 1:
From the equations above, the slope of the function F(.) is given by
for r1<R*, and
for r1>R*.  For any time-1 fund returns a < R* and b > R* , the difference in the slopes of the
function at the two returns b and a is given by:
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Notice that the difference is zero if and only if σ2s equals zero.  Otherwise, the difference is
positive. 
To prove the second part of the proposition, note that the derivative of the slope
differential with respect to the variance σ2s is positive:
for any a < R* and any b > R*.  
Proof of Proposition 2:
The first part of the proposition can be seen by noting that (14) is still positive when σ2a =
0, so long as the uncertainty about the strategy-specific component remains non-zero (σ2s > 0).  
The second part can be seen by differentiating (12) and (13) with respect to σ2a:
for r1<R*, and 
for r1>R*.    Since we are assuming that (1-δ)µ0-δ>0, equations 16 and 17 are both are positive.
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Appendix B:Test of an Alternate Hypothesis
A straightforward way to check whether our results reflect managers moving toward
factor portfolios after bad performance  is to examine average loading change as a function of
performance.  Table B.I contains the results, with Panel A examining loading change as a
function of performance and Panel B attempting to control for category-wide shifts in loading by
measuring loading as the deviation from the category average.  For each panel, averaging is
performed over a number of different sets of factors: all four factors; all but the RMRF factor;
and, each factor individually.  Under the alternative hypothesis, fund mangers exploit the fact
that Jensen’s alpha can be inflated by increasing the fund’s loadings on factors with a positive
risk price other than the market. This explains why we examine loading change averaged over all
but the market factor.  Loading changes are also reported for each factor separately to identify
which factors (if any) the fund managers load up on after bad performance.
The alternative hypothesis relies on expected returns being positive for the three factors
other than the market.  Empirical work using sample periods going back in time much further
than ours have found that all three have positive average returns.  During our sample period, the
SMB, HML and MOM zero-investment portfolios earned average (annualized) returns of five,
!2.5 and 425 basis points respectively.  Thus, it appears that only the momentum effect works
over our sample period.  However, managers learning of the Fama and French (1992, 1993)
results would expect both SMB and HML to have positive mean returns.  
The results in Table B.I provide very little support for the alternative hypothesis
described in this subsection.  The first row of Panel A averages loading changes over all four
factors and shows that the average loading change is significantly negative over the sample
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period.  The second row reports that the average loading change becomes insignificantly
negative when the loading on the market is excluded.  Moreover, irrespective of whether the
change in market Beta is included, average loading change does not vary from the lowest
performance quartile to the other three.
We now turn to the results for the individual loading changes which are contained in the
last four rows of each panel.  The last column of Panel A shows that only the SMB loading has
increased over the sample period, though not significantly, while both the market Beta and the
momentum loading have actually decreased significantly over the period.  Comparing the
loading change for the bottom performance quartile to the average for the other three, both
panels indicate that funds increase their MOM loading and decrease their HML loading after
poor performance, relative to average and good performers.  However, with respect to the MOM
result, it appears to be driven by good performers decreasing their MOM loadings, rather than by
bad performers increasing theirs.  Finally, neither market Beta nor SMB loading is
systematically affected by fund performance.  
Taken as a whole, the evidence in Table B.I provides little support for the alternative
hypothesis that managers are learning about size, book-to-market and momentum effects over
the period and inflating their loadings, particularly after bad performance, to earn high CAPM
abnormal returns. 
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1.They also sorted on one-, two- and eight-quarter returns.  The four-quarter results are most
appropriate here since that is the period studied in the fund-flow literature.
2.Market index minus Tbill, small stocks minus large stocks, high “growth” minus high “value,”
and long-maturity bonds minus Tbill. These are his results for three-year formation and holding
periods; he also reports one-year results, which are somewhat noisier.
3.Though the investment advisor could have trouble retaining managers with extremely good
performance, like Peter Lynch.
4.Also, funds which disappear due to merger or death tend to have bad performance just prior to
disappearance (Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996)). Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carpenter and
Lynch (1999) and Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and Musto (2002)).  
5.Both propositions are proved in Appendix A.
6.The diversification benefit from holding multiple funds follows from the assumption that the
fund-specific return components are uncorrelated across funds.  However, the same qualitative
results are obtained if those components are correlated, so long as the correlation is less than
perfect.
7.A fund does not have to think about a strategy change explicitly in terms of changing factor
loadings for loading change to be a useful proxy for strategy change. Rather, it is enough that a
strategy change (however implemented) results in larger loading changes on average than not
changing strategy at all.   Moreover, loading change does not need to be perfectly correlated with
strategy change to be a useful proxy.  This is important since certain types of strategies, by
definition, do cause loading changes.  For example, a strategy in which the manager tries to
identify periods when the expected returns on the factors are high.  For our purposes, it is enough
Footnotes
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that larger absolute loading changes by a fund increases the likelihood that the fund has changed
strategy.
8.We are grateful to Jeff Busse for providing this data.
9.The snapshot is taken some time early in the year following the year it describes.    The date of
the most recent manager change could have been in this following year, in which case it could
have been reported in that snapshot.  We see examples of this in the data.  We also see a few
occasions when MGR_DATE goes down, i.e. its value in a later snapshot is actually earlier. 
This presumably reflects a change in ICDI's (later Micropal's) opinion as to when the current
manager took control.
10.We measure loading change from y-1, rather than from y, because the estimation errors in
year-y loadings are related to the estimation errors in year-y performance, as they are estimated
in the same regression.  Inserting a year between the estimates also avoids confusion with
window-dressing effects, because while year y-1's loser funds are more likely to distort their
portfolios at the end of y-1 (Musto (1999)), this distortion is unlikely to persist through y all the
way to y+1.
11.LCOR is defined to be LDEL but with each component loading change deflated by an
estimate of its standard error, which is based on standard errors from the four-factor OLS
regressions.
12.While Sirri and Tufano (1998) estimate piecewise flow-performance regressions that allow
the slopes to vary by performance quintile, we have much less data and thus only allow for one
kink at zero performance.  
13.Note that the measurement error associated with LDEL as an estimate of true loading change
is unlikely to be related to next year’s DFL and so it’s likely to downward bias the magnitudes of
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the interaction coefficients.  This downward bias makes it harder to obtain results that support
our model.
37
Table I
Loading-Change Results
For y from 1985 to 1995 for each fund i in the Micropal universe, daily fund returns are regressed on the
simultaneous returns of the Carhart (1997) four factors for each year from y-1 to y+1 with at least 20 daily fund
returns.  The fitted coefficients are an intercept αi,t and estimated factor loadings bRMRF,i,t, bSMB,i,t, bHML,i,t and bMOM,i,t for
t = y-1, y, and y+1.  The initial sample of 6243 fund observations i,y are those with loadings data for years y-1, y and
y+1.  Rαi,t is αi,t minus the average αi,t of the funds of i’s type (Aggressive Growth, Growth and Income, and Long-
Term Capital Gains)  in the Micropal universe with a usable loading observation in year t.   LDELi,y is the average
absolute change of fund i’s factor loadings from y-1 to y+1 while LCORi,y is LDELi,y scaled by an estimate of its
standard error.  The fund flow variable used is DFLi,t/ (TNAi,t -TNAi,t-1(1+ri,yt)) where TNAi,t is the total net assets of
fund i at the end of year t, and ri,t is the total return of fund i in year t.  Any fund observation i,y without a value for
DFLi,y+1 is omitted: 283 observations are omitted for this reason, leaving 5960 observations.
Panel A reports average LDELi,y and LCORi,y among the funds with the indicated performance.  The Quartiles p-
value column reports p-values for a t-test of a higher average for the bottom than top three performance quartiles
while the Sign Groups p-value column reports p-values for a t-test of a higher average for the <0 than the >0
performance groups.  Panel B reports results for regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance on year-y
performance, allowing for a kink in the regression line at zero year-y performance.  LDELi,y is included as an
independent variable and is allowed to interact both with negative and positive year-y performance.  T-statistics
based on White standard errors are below, in italics.
Panel A: Average LDELi,y for subsamples formed on year-y performance (in %)
perf All Quartiles Sign Groups 
Bottom 3rd 2nd Top Top 3 p-val <0 >0 p-val
Rα 0.177 0.204 0.169 0.154 0.183 0.169 <0.001 0.183 0.171 0.003
α 0.205 0.163 0.150 0.191 0.169 <0.001 0.175 0.183 0.963
  Average LCORi,y for subsamples formed on year-y performance (in %)
perf All Quartiles Sign Groups 
Bottom 3rd 2nd Top Top 3 p-val <0 >0 p-val
Rα 1.841 1.931 1.825 1.809 1.812 1.814 0.001 1.874 1.804 0.005
α 1.894 1.847 1.758 1.866 1.824 0.016 1.834 1.854 0.742
Panel B: Regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance on year-y performance
Yi,y+1=b0 + b1LDELi,y + b2(perfi,y)+ + b3(LDELi,y)(perfi,y)+ + b4(perfi,y)- + b5(LDELi,y)(perfi,y)- +gi,y+1
where (.)+ /max (0,.) and (.)! /min (0,.).
Y perf b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
DFL Rα 34.49
5.03
-21.70
-0.93
2779
5.38
-1551
-0.93
1328
6.80
-1799
-3.20
α 54.66
7.24
-35.92
-1.56
1185
2.37
279
0.19 
1488
6.86
-1905
-3.31
perf Rα -0.00
-0.29
-0.005
-1.12
0.107
1.76
-0.246
-0.97
0.270
5.22
0.192
0.92
α -0.01
-8.66
-0.007
-1.63
0.113
1.41
-0.216
-0.66
0.323
7.42
0.107
0.57
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Table II
Loading-Change Dummy Results
For y from 1985 to 1995 for each fund i in the Micropal universe, daily fund returns are regressed on the
simultaneous returns of the Carhart (1997) four factors for each year from y-1 to y+1 with at least 20 daily fund
returns.  The fitted coefficients are an intercept αi,t and estimated factor loadings bRMRF,i,t, bSMB,i,t, bHML,i,t and bMOM,i,t for
t = y-1, y, and y+1.  The initial sample of 6243 fund observations i,y are those with loadings data for years y-1, y and
y+1.  Rαi,t is αi,t minus the average αi,t of the funds of i’s type (Aggressive Growth, Growth and Income, and Long-
Term Capital Gains)  in the Micropal universe with a usable loading observation in year t.   LDELi,y is the average
absolute change of fund i’s factor loadings from y-1 to y+1.  The fund flow variable used is DFLi,t/ (TNAi,t -TNAi,t-
1(1+ri,yt)) where TNAi,t is the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t, and ri,t is the total return of fund i in year t. 
Any fund observation i,y without a value for DFLi,y+1 is omitted: 283 observations are omitted for this reason,
leaving 5960 observations.   QLCHi,y is “1" if LDELi,y is in the top LDEL-quartile in year y for the funds in i’s
category included in the sample, and “0" otherwise.  
Panel A reports the incidence of QLCHi,y=1 among the funds with the indicated performance.  The Quartiles p-value
column reports p-values for a χ2 tests of equal proportions across the bottom and top three performance quartiles
while the Sign Groups p-value column reports p-values for a χ2 tests of equal proportions across the <0 and >0
performance groups.  Panel B reports results for regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance on year-y
performance, allowing for a kink in the regression line at zero year-y performance.  The QLCHi,y dummy is used in
the regressions to estimate two separate regression lines, one for funds with QLCHi,y = 1 and another for funds with
QLCHi,y = 0.  T-statistics based on White standard errors are below, in italics.
Panel A: Proportion of funds with QLCHi,y=1 for subsamples formed on year-y performance (in %)
perf All Quartiles Sign Groups 
Bottom 3rd 2nd Top Top 3 p-val <0 >0 p-val
Rα 25.17 33.75 22.27 18.49 26.51 22.46 <0.001 26.53 23.60 0.009
α 27.50 23.55 19.23 30.40 24.42 0.019 25.33 24.85 0.687
Panel B: Regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance on year-y performance
Yi,y+1=b0 + b1QLCHi,y + b2(perfi,y)+ + b3(QLCHi,y)(perfi,y)+ + b4(perfi,y)- + b5(QLCHi,y)(perfi,y)- +gi,y+1
where (.)+ /max (0,.) and (.)! /min (0,.).
Y perf b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
DFL Rα 29.49
5.20
6.91
0.63
2741
6.03
-1023
1.40
1136
6.94
-470
-2.06
α 47.42
7.66
3.13
0.27
1434
3.24
-491
-0.75
1252
7.00
-452
-1.85
perf Rα -0.00
-0.86
-0.00
-1.07
0.067
1.55
-0.077
-0.74
0.299
8.06
0.051
0.66
α -0.01
-12.84
-0.00
-1.42
0.069
1.43
-0.064
-0.55
0.358
11.14
-0.004
-0.05
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Table III
Manager-Change Results
For y from 1991 to 1994 for each fund i in the Micropal universe, daily fund returns are regressed on the
simultaneous returns of the Carhart (1997) four factors for each year from y to y+1 with at least 20 daily fund
returns.  The fitted coefficients are an intercept α,i,t and estimated factor loadings bRMRF,i,t, bSMB,i,t, bHML,i,t and bMOM,i,t
for t = y and y+1.  The initial sample of 4663 fund observations i,y are those with loadings data for years y and y+1. 
Rα,i,t is αi,t minus the average αi,t of the funds of i’s type (Aggressive Growth, Growth and Income, and Long-Term
Capital Gains) in the Micropal universe with a usable loading observation in year t.  QMCHi,y is “1" if the most
recent manager change date recorded on CRSP for year y+1 occurred either sometime during year y (if no month is
given) or between July of year y and June of year y+1; QMCHi,y is “0" if the most recent manager change date lies
outside these ranges.  A QMCHi,y value of “1" is changed to “0" if: a) year y is the commencement year for the fund
as recorded on CRSP; b) the most recent manager change date recorded on CRSP for year y+1 occurred sometime
during year y; and, c) the first fund return on CRSP is not for a month prior to the most recent manager change date. 
The fund flow variable used is DFLi,t/ (TNAi,t -TNAi,t-1(1+ri,t)) where TNAi,t is the total net assets of fund i at the end
of year t, and ri,t is the total return of fund i in year t.  Any fund observation i,y without a value for QMCHi,y or
DFLi,y+1 is omitted: 312 observations were omitted for these reasons, leaving 4351 observations.   
Panel A reports the incidence of QMCHi,y=1 among the funds with the indicated performance.  The Quartiles p-
value column reports p-values for a χ2 tests of equal proportions across the bottom and top three performance
quartiles while the Sign Groups p-value column reports p-values for a χ2 tests of equal proportions across the <0
and >0 performance groups.  Panels B reports results for regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance
on year-y performance, allowing for a kink in the regression line at zero year-y performance.  The QMCHi,y dummy
is used in the regressions to estimate two separate regression lines, one for funds with QMCHi,y = 1 and another for
funds with QMCHi,y = 0.  T-statistics based on White standard errors are below, in italics.
Panel A: Proportion of funds with QMCHi,y=1 for subsamples formed on year-y performance (in %)
perf All Quartiles Sign Groups 
Bottom 3rd 2nd Top Top 3 p-val <0 >0 p-val
Rα 9.08 13.45 10.25 6.91 5.94 7.68 <0.001 10.23 6.17 <0.001
α 11.87 11.63 7.01 5.96 8.18 <0.001 11.94 6.42 <0.001
Panel B: Regressions of year-(y+1) flow or year-(y+1) performance on year-y performance
Yi,y+1=b0 + b1QLCHi,y + b2(perfi,y)+ + b3(QLCHi,y)(perfi,y)+ + b4(perfi,y)- + b5(QLCHi,y)(perfi,y)- +gi,y+1
where (.)+ /max (0,.) and (.)! /min (0,.).
Y perf b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
DFL Rα 60.56
10.30
-22.28
-1.26
592
3.58
-83
-0.18
969
4.69
-451
-1.30
α 74.93
10.85
-29.89
-1.72
343
2.34
94
0.20
1140
5.62
-621
-1.98
perf Rα -0.00
-0.16
-0.00
-1.97
0.043
2.06
0.056
0.93
0.285
3.99
-0.222
-2.35
α -0.01
-14.61
-0.00
-2.23
-0.003
-0.14
0.108
1.61
0.259
4.98
-0.197
-2.60
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Table B.I
Signed Loading-change Results
For y from 1986 to 1994 for all funds i with data from y-1 to y+1, daily fund returns are regressed on the
simultaneous returns of the Carhart (1997) four factors for each year from y-1 to y+1.  The fitted
coefficients are an intercept αi,t and estimated factor loadings bRMRF,i,t, bSMB,i,t, bHML,i,t and bMOM,i,t for t = y-1,
y, and y+1.  DELF,i,y is the average change of fund i’s factor loadings from y-1 to y+1 for the set of factors
F. Six sets of factors are considered: all four factors (all four); all factors but RMRF (not RMRF); and
each factor individually.  For j = 2, 3, and 4, Qj,i,y is “1" if αi,y is in the jth quartile in year  y for i’s
category, and “0" otherwise.  Regressions are run for the entire sample and have 6243 observations:
DELF,i,y = υF,1 + φF,2Q2,i,y + φF,3Q3,i,y + φF,4Q4,i,y + εF,i,y
For j = 2, 3, and 4, the regression coefficient φF,j measures the difference between the average factor
change for performance (α) quartiles j and 1, while the intercept υF,1  measures the average factor change
for the bottom (first) performance quartile.  Two hypotheses are tested:  average factor change for quartile
1 equals the average factor change across the other three quartiles:  (φF,4+φF,3+φF,2)/3 = 0; and, average
factor change across all four quartiles equals zero: υF,1+(φF,4+φF,3+φF,2)/4 = 0.   T-statistics based on White
standard errors are in bold.   
F (set of factors) υF,1 φF,2 φF,3 φF,4 (φF,4+φF,3+φF,2)/3 υF,1+(φF,4+φF,3+φF,2)/4
all four -0.010 -0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.010
-1.61 -0.91 0.08 0.63 -0.10 -4.18
not RMRF -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 0.007 0.001 -0.003
-0.58 -0.62 -0.03 0.91 0.08 -1.26
RMRF -0.027 -0.012 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.030
-3.96 -1.40 0.34 -0.37 -0.56 -10.33
SMB 0.011 -0.017 -0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.007
1.04 -1.32 -0.38 0.40 -0.49 1.65
HML -0.019 0.005 0.014 0.056 0.025 -0.000
-2.12 0.44 1.25 4.34 2.46 -0.09
MOM -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.039 -0.018 -0.016
-0.34 -0.44 -1.10 -3.79 -2.11 -4.78
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Figure 1.  Mean future returns net of risk-free rate.  HPZ is the first row of Table III, Panel C
of that paper, times four; BG is the first row of Table VII, Panel A of that paper; and, Carhart is
from the first column of Table III of that paper, times twelve.
Figure 2.  Mean future returns net of market risk.  HPZ is the sixth row of Table III, Panel C
of that paper, times four; BG is the fourth row of Table VII, Panel A of that paper; and, Carhart
is from the third column of Table III of that paper, times twelve.
Figure 3.  Relationship between past and future monthly four-index alphas.  From Gruber
(1996); last column of Table II of that paper, times twelve.
Figure 4.  Fund flows as a function of past return.  Flow/performance relation predicted by
the model with α=0.0001, δ=0.01, µ0=0.08, σ2a=0.005, σ2s=0.02 and σ2p=0.025.
Figure 5.  Effect of strategy-specific portion on fund-flow response.  Flow/performance
relation predicted by the model with α=0.0001, δ=0.01, µ0=0.08, σ2a=0.005, σ2p=0.025, and the
three indicated values for σ2s.
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